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Abstract—In heterogeneous ultra-dense networks (HetUDNs),
the software-defined wireless network (SDWN) separates resource
management from the geo-distributed resources belonging to
different service providers. Through a centralized SDWN con-
troller, the operation of the entire network can be managed in a
global manner. In this work, we focus on mobile traffic offloading
and resource allocation in the SDWN-based HetUDNs, which is
constituted of heterogeneous macro base stations (MBSs) and
small-cell base stations (SBSs). We explore a scenario where the
capacity of the SBSs is accessible, but their expected performance
for offloading cannot be known to the SDWN controller, which
is the information asymmetric case. To address this asymmetry,
a bundle of incentive traffic offloading contracts is designed, to
encourage each SBS to select the contract specifically designed
to achieve its own maximum net utility. Meanwhile, the MBS
utility and social welfare can also be optimized, in comparison
to the situation without information asymmetry. To aggregate
the characteristics of large numbers of SBSs in HetUDNs,
we develop an analytical model that characterizes the SBS
type based on different contracts which can be designed with
individual rationality and incentive compatibility. This leads to
an analytical expression in closed-form for SBS type which we
validate mathematically and by simulations, and observe that
the monotonicity and incentive compatibility of contracts are
ensured. The effectiveness and efficiency of the contract-based
traffic offloading mechanism that we design, and the overall
system performance are also validated with simulation results.
Index Terms—Traffic offloading, software defined wireless
networks (SDWNs), contract theory, heterogeneous ultra-dense
networks (HetUDNs), resource sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifth Generation (5G) cellular networks were first proposed
to meet the increasing mobile data traffic, which will expand
one thousand times from 2010 to 2020 [1], [2], [3]. To
meet this increasing data challenge, ultra-densification, i.e.,
overlaying macro base stations (MBSs) with a large number
of small-cell base stations (SBSs) such as pico base stations
(BSs), femto BSs and WiFi hotspots, etc., which constitute
the heterogeneous networks (HetNets), is commented as one
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of the “big three” 5G technologies [4]. With assistance of
these SBSs, the mobile traffic offloading technology provides a
solution to address the enormous expansion of mobile data, by
moving traffic load from the cellular networks to the alternative
wireless networks consisting of densely distributed SBSs. To
operate such heterogeneous ultra-dense networks (HetUDNs),
the effective and efficient network architecture and resource
management mechanisms are extremely necessary. In recent
years, cloud-based Software-defined Wireless Networks (SD-
WNs) are proposed, which can control and manage HetUDNs
in a central manner efficiently. SDWNs provide the potential
solution to revolutionize the network design and resource
management, and enable the applications to manipulate var-
ious services by separating the control plane from the data
plane [5], [6]. In SDWNs, mobile traffic offloading can be
enabled by the SDWN at edge [7], which is able to recognize
the knowledge of data requests and network resource status
of MBSs and SBSs. With a centralized controller, resources
in HetUDNs can be managed efficiently to meet data requests
from mobile users, and optimize the system performance such
as data rate, load balancing and energy consumption.
Recently, mobile traffic offloading in HetNets received
significant attention for its effectiveness on releasing the heavy
traffic load among the cellular networks by applying necessary
switch, exchange, access control and compatibility protocol-
s [8]. Focusing on the energy consumption optimization [9],
[10], security guarantee [11], performance analysis [12], etc.,
many works paid attention to the mechanism design for
mobile traffic offloading. As investigated in [5], the resource
management in SDWNs is a kind of competitive market, where
resource requesters and providers can compete and cooperate
to maximize their own utilities. For traffic offloading in
SDWN-based HetUDNs, competition and cooperation among
resource providing and utilizing entities can be modeled and
analyzed with the help of economics theory [13]. Game theory
is a valid tool to model the supply-demand relationship of
resource for traffic offloading in HetNets, and many different
game theory based offloading approaches have been applied,
such as Nash bargaining game [14], [15], coalition game [16],
Stackelberg game [17], etc. In HetNets with densely distribut-
ed BSs, the computational complexity of such approaches
grows exponentially, so that mean-field games are needed
for low-complexity tractable partial differential equation based
solutions to deal with traffic offloading [18], [19], [20].
Auction theory is an important tool in network economics
to model and analyze resource supply and demand, especially
for networks with heterogeneous transmission resource. Much
analytical work has been carried out in this area, starting from
the analysis of price and income in single [21] and networked
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can be found in [23], while in [24], [25], [26], the authors fo-
cused on the effect of an auction on the success of bidders who
must also make optimal choices. Auctions can also be used
in a network to automatically carry out objectives which may
satisfy either the sellers or the buyers [27], and can be used
in resource allocation to dynamically offer admission control
based on resource availability [28]. In SDWN-based HetNets,
the central controller performs as an auction broker, and traffic
offloading can be operated efficiently with appropriate auction
mechanisms, such as “double” [29] and reverse auctions [30].
In SDWN-based HetUDNs, despite the existence of a cen-
tral controller, SBSs are selfish and may hide or fabricate their
resource status. The capacity of the SBSs’ resource can be
recognized by the central controller, however, their resource
performance for offloading may be unaccessible. To achieve
an incentive compatibility, contract theory can be introduced
to the traffic offloading mechanism designs. Contract theory,
as a powerful framework from microeconomics, is proposed to
essentially deal with information asymmetry in the market, i.e.,
the service capability of “employees” cannot be observed by
“employers” before they are employed. According to contract
theory, an incentive mechanism can be realized, which will
encourage every employee to consciously choose the contract
designed to its service capability. It has been applied into
the resource allocation problems for device-to-device commu-
nications [31], heterogeneous Long-term Evlution-Advanced
(LTE-A) networks [32] and heterogeneous cloud-based radio
access networks [33]. The classic contract theory is based
on the definition of different employee types, which is just
considered as an abstract index without any specific definition
in the aforementioned studies. Especially for the HetUDN with
a large number of SBSs, this weak definition of SBS type
will bring difficulties when applying contract models into real
network environment. In this work, we pay special attention
to the SBS types and investigate how the types can affect the
performance of contract-based traffic offloading mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the SDWN framework for resource sharing in HetUDNs is
described. The contract formulation and three contract-based
traffic offloading mechanisms are designed in Section III and
Section IV, respectively. Conditions for contract feasibility are
analyzed and derived in Section V. Simulations are shown in
Section VI, and conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. ARCHITECTURE OF SDWN
SDWN is an emerging network framework which separates
the control plane from the data plane. The architecture of the
SDWN-based resource sharing system of HetUDNs is shown
as Fig. 1. In the resource and application level, the network
provides data services with distributed MBSs and SBSs. These
heterogeneous BSs are operated by the same or different
operators (service providers) and deployed with a high density,
which means that their coverage areas are overlapped serious-
ly. The MBSs’ mobile user equipments (MUEs) and small
cell user equipments (SUEs) are randomly distributed in the
coverage of the BSs. Through traffic offloading, the throughput
and other performance of the system can be improved.
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Fig. 1. Traffic offloading and resource allocation for SDWN-based HetUDNs.
As shown in Fig. 1, the SDWN separates resource manage-
ment from the geo-distributed resource cloud, which forms a
virtual network topology in the control plane. In the control
plane, the centralized SDWN Controller discovers the traffic
demands of MUEs, available transmission resource and the
channel status in of the HetUDN through the Access Network
Discovery and Selection Function (ANDSF). The ANDSF
fulfils this mission above by requiring to the MBS and SBSs,
the current LTE/cellular network operators of which are more
than willing to share the status information above to maximize
their service capability and resource utilization. After receiving
the supply and demand status of network resource, the SDWN
controller designs a bundle of contracts for different types of
SBSs, and then broadcasts the contracts to the MBS and all
SBSs through the ANDSF. Every SBS distributed within the
coverage of the MBS selects one contract to maximize its own
payoff, and reports its selection to the SDWN controller that
it will provide the certain amount of traffic offloading and get
the certain payments from the MBS specified by the selected
contract. According to the SBS’s contract selection, Then the
SDWN controller allocates this SBS’s bandwidth resource for
MUEs covered by this SBS, and requests the MBS to pay the
SBS for its offloading service. During the process above, the
ANDSF performs as a medium for the information interaction
between the HetUDN and the SDWN Controller, and an
executive of resource allocation. The ANDSF can interact
with the SDWN controller for traffic offloading and resource
allocation by standardized interfaces such as OpenFlow-enable
switches [7], [13], which need some corresponding modifica-
tions for the requested and released information mentioned
above. Moreover, in this work, we focus on the bandwidth
resource allocation of the heterogeneous SBSs in the system.
III. CONTRACT FORMULATION FOR TRAFFIC OFFLOADING
Consider an SDWN-based HetUDN with one MBS and a
number of SBSs randomly distributed in the coverage of the
MBS. These SBSs are not owned by the MBS operator, which
means that the MBS cannot obtain the local information, such
as transmission capacity, load status, operation and offloading
cost, etc., of these SBSs. This model is flexible to be applied
into a system with multiple MBSs, in which all SBSs can
be associated to their respective MBS according to a certain
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MBS and its associating SBSs can be analyzed by the system
model of this work. We denote with N =f1; 2;  ; Ng as the
set of SBSs. Consider a set of M=f1; 2;  ;Mg MUEs who
are randomly distributed within the coverage of the MBS. In
addition, let Mn be the set of MUEs in the coverage of SBS
n 2 N , then we have Tn2NMn=M. Let Ni denote the set
of SBSs who can cover MUE i 2M, which means that SBS
n2Ni can provide the traffic offloading service for MUE i.
Assume that the time is slotted. During the duration of
a time slot, the location of MUEs, the offloading decision
of SBSs and resource allocation are considered to be fixed.
Denote sn = fsnigi2Mn as the scheduling vector, where
sni=1 indicates that the traffic of MUE i is allocated to be
offloaded by SBS n, and sni=0, otherwise. Assume that each
MUE can be associated with at most one SBS, i.e., 8i2M,P
n2N sni 1. The case of
P
n2N sni=0 indicates that the
traffic requested by MUE i is not offloaded by any SBS and
is delivered by the MBS directly. Let s0i=1 denote that MUE
i is served by the MBS without any SBS offloading for it.
A. Transmission model formulation
The transmission data rate can be used to evaluate the
performance of the HetUDN, and is related to the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). In this work, we model
the channel between MUEs and BSs as a Rayleigh fading
channel. Then 8n 2 N and i 2 M, the SINR from SBS n
and the MBS to MUE i is defined as
ni =
pnjhnij2P
n02Ni n0ipn0 jhn0ij
2 + 00ip0jh0ij2 + 2
; (1a)
0i =
p0jh0ij2P
n2N 
0
nipnjhnij2 + 2
; (1b)
respectively. In (1a) and (1b), 2 is the constant addictive
noise power, while pn and pn0 are the transmission power
consumption of SBS n and n0, respectively. n0i 2 [0; 1] is
the interference parameter among SBSs, and 00i, 0ni2 [0; 1]
are the interference parameters between the MBS and SBSs.
Considering different licensed spectrum applied for direct
transmission by the MBS and traffic offloading by SBSs, the
interference between the MBS and SBSs can be ignored, i.e.,
00i = 0ni = 0. Then considering the channel allocation, the
achievable service rate for MUE i can be presented by
ri=!0s0i log (1+0i)+
P
n2N !nsni log (1+ni); (2)
where !n and !0 are the bandwidths of spectrum used by SBS
n and the MBS. Take LTE-A for instance, the bandwidth for
one resource block is ! = 180 kHz. Considering all SBSs in
the network utilize the common spectrum for traffic offloading,
then let !n = !, 8n 2 N . Let yn denote the traffic offloading
accepted by or allocated to SBS n, i.e., yn =
P
i2Mn rnisni.
B. Economic models formulation
The offloading quality provided by heterogeneous SBSs is
different. On the other hand, the benefit for the MBS from
different SBSs is different as well. For instance, the MBS tends
to get much more benefit from SBSs those located closed to the
edge of MBS’s coverage. Therefore, it is better for the SDWN
controller to design diverse contracts for the heterogeneous
BSs, to improve the performance of the HetUDN.
Utility of MBS: Let Tn(yn) be the payment for SBS n when
it helps to offload the amount of yn traffic. Assume Tn(0)=0,
and in addition, Tn(yn) is a strictly increasing function of yn,
8n2N . Then we define the utility of MBS as
U (s;y;T (y)) = 
P
i2M ri  
P
n2N Tn (yn); (3)
where s = fs0i; snig(N+1)M denotes the association matrix,
y = fyngn2N is the traffic offloading vector, T (y) =
fTn (y)gn2N denotes the vector of payment bundles for
different types of SBSs, and  is the MBS’s unit monetary
gain through the traffic rate.
Utility of SBSs: Let xn (n 2 N ) denote the SBS n’s
own traffic demands. Assume that traffic requests arrival for
different SBSs are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), and follows a probability distribution function fn (x).
In this work, we consider the traffic requests are sequences of
Poisson arrivals with arrival rate n, 8n 2 N .
We define  n, transmission efficiency of SBS n, as the
average amount of data traffic (bits) can be delivered by one
unit of bandwidth resource per time unit, which is given by
 n =
P
i2Mn rni
!n
frnigi2Mn0 ; (4)
where rni=!nlog (1+ni) denotes the achievable data rate of
MUE i receiving from SBS n, and kk0 calculates the number
of non-zero elements. Then the average bandwidth resource
consumption for SBS n on delivering one unit traffic is 1= n.
Let 
n denote the resource capacity of SBS n. Then we
have yn  
n n, 8n 2 N . In addition, denote wn > 0 as SBS
n’s average revenue achieved from one unit of its bandwidth
resource consumption caused by its own traffic demands. Let
cn (0 < cn < wn) represent SBS n’s average cost on one unit
of bandwidth utilization. Then the expected revenue of SBS
n resulting from serving its own traffic demands is given by
Pn (
n) = (wn   cn)E (xn= n)
= (wn cn)
Z 
n n
0
x
 n
fn(x) dx+
Z 1

n n

nfn(x) dx

=an

1  e 
n nn

;
(5)
where an = n (wn   cn)= n, and fn (x) =  1n e 
 1
n x.
Furthermore, given feasible amount of traffic offloading by
SBS n, the expected revenue from the rest bandwidth resource
for serving this SBS’s own traffic demands can be obtained as
Pn (
n   yn= n) = an

1  e 
n n ynn

: (6)
Then the utility of SBS n from traffic offloading is given by
Vn=Pn (
n yn= n)+Tn (yn) cnyn= n; 8n2N : (7)
In addition, we define the net utility of SBS n as the SBS
utility improvement when offloading traffic for the MBS:
V 0n = Vn   Pn (
n); 8n 2 N : (8)
In (7), we assume that the total revenue of SBS n:
vn (yn) = Pn (
n   yn= n) + Tn (yn) (9)
is a strictly increasing concave function of yn, i.e., v0 (yn)>
0, and v00 (yn) < 0. This setting is reasonable, due to that
as the amount of offloading traffic increasing, payment T (y)
4from the MBS increases slowly, and meanwhile the income
brought to the SBSs grows slowly, which also results from
less service for SBSs’ own traffic requests. This property of
revenue function will be further analyzed in Section V.
Social welfare: The social welfare of HetUDN is defined
as the aggregate utility of the MBS and SBSs, denoted by
W =
X
n2N Un +
X
n2N Vn
=
X
n2N
h

X
i2Mn
ri   Tn (yn)
i
+
X
n2N

Pn


n   yn
 n

+ Tn (yn)  cnyn
 n

= 
X
i2M ri| {z }
MBS: Profit from
MUEs’ throughput
+
X
n2NPn


n  yn
 n

| {z }
SBS: Profit from serving
its own traffic demands
 
X
n2N
cnyn
 n| {z }
SBS: Cost
of offloading
:
(10)
IV. CONTRACT DESIGN FOR TRAFFIC OFFLOADING
According to contract theory, a reasonable definition of
SBS’s type is very important to realize the contract-based
traffic offloading. So first of all, we propose a new definition
of the SBS type for traffic offloading in the HetUDN as
Definition 1, based on the models established previously.
Definition 1. SBS Type: In the HetUDN with multiple SBSs,
the definition of SBS n’s type, which is determined by SBS’s
transmission efficiency  n, resource capability 
n, average
revenue achieved from per unit of its bandwidth resource
consumption caused by SUEs’ traffic demands wn, average
cost on one unit of bandwidth utilization cn and the arrival
rate of SUEs’ traffic requests n = , is given by
n =  n=
h
cn + (wn   cn) e 

n n

i
: (11)
Remarks: Notice that the definition of the SBS type is
reasonable since that (11) gives an index which can reflect the
SBS’s capability of providing traffic offloading service for the
MBS. To be specific, Definition 1 indicates that a larger value
of SBS type n, which means a smaller cn= n (SBS n’s cost
by one unit of traffic transmission), smaller (wn   cn)= n
(SBS n’s net benefits from one unit of traffic transmission
for SUEs), larger 
n n (SBS n’s maximum resource can
be provided for transmission) and lower  (SBS n’s traffic
load from its own users), indicates a stronger capability of
providing the traffic offloading service for the MBS.
According to Definition 1, each of the N SBSs in the
HetUDN belongs to one of the N types. In the SDWN-
based HetUDN, the SDWN controller needs to design a
bundle of contracts fT (y) ;yg for these N types of SBSs.
Consequently, based on the definitions above, the traffic of-
floading contract for SBS n with type n can be expressed by
fTn (yn) ; yng. Next, we will introduce necessary principles
that ensure a contract to be valid and feasible.
A. Contract design with information asymmetry
1) Individual Rationality (IR): No matter whether the MBS
and the SDWN controller can identify the types of SBSs, the
designed traffic offloading contract must ensure that every SBS
has an incentive to provide the traffic offloading service for
MUEs. Therefore, the following Individual Rationality (IR)
constraint must be satisfied when designing the contracts.
Definition 2. Individual Rationality (IR): Any type of SBSs
in the HetUDN will only select the traffic offloading contract
that can guarantee that the utility received is not less than
its utility can be received when it does not provide the traffic
offloading service, i.e., 8n = 1; 2;    ; N ,
Vn = Pn


n   yn
 n

+ Tn (yn)  cnyn
 n
> Pn (
n) : (12)
2) Incentive Compatibility (IC): Under the situation with
information asymmetry, SBSs tends to request high payment
and provide the traffic offloading service as little as possible,
according to (7). To ensure that every SBS will select the right
contract designed for its type specially, the designed bundle
of contracts must make sure that the maximum utility can be
achieved if and only if the SBS selects the contract for its
type specially. This principle of contract designing is called
Incentive Compatibility (IC), which is defined as Definition 3.
Definition 3. Incentive Compatibility (IC): Any type of SBSs
in the HetUDN will obtain the maximum utility if and only if it
selects the contract for its own type specially. In other words,
selecting the traffic offloading contract designed for its type
will bring to this SBS more utility than any other contracts in
the contract bundle, i.e., 8n;m = 1; 2;    ; N ,
Vn (Tn; yn)=Pn


n  yn
 n

+Tn (yn)  cnyn
 n
 Vn (Tm; ym)=Pn


n  ym
 n

+Tm (ym)  cnym
 n
:
(13)
Due to the case of information asymmetry, the types of SB-
Ss cannot be accessed by the ANDSF. However, the knowledge
of the probability n, with which an SBS might belong to type
n, is available for the SDWN controller, and
P
n2N n = 1.
Therefore, with the IR and IC constraints, the SDWN con-
troller will formulate the bundle of traffic offloading contracts
which will maximize the MBS’s utility. Then the contract-
based traffic offloading optimization problem in the scenario
with information asymmetry is formulated as
max U(s;y;T (y))=
X
n2N
n
"

X
i2Mn
ri Tn (yn)
#
; (14a)
s.t. s0i +
X
n2N sni = 1; 8i = 1; 2;    ;M; (14b)
yn =
X
i2Mn
rnisni  0; 8n = 1; 2;    ; N; (14c)

n   yn
 n
; 8n = 1; 2;    ; N; (14d)
Tn (yn)  cnyn
 n
 ane 

n n
n

e
yn
n   1

0;
8n = 1; 2;    ; N; (IR)
(14e)
Pn


n   yn
 n

+ Tn (yn)  cnyn
 n
 Pn


n   ym
 n

+ Tm (ym)  cnym
 n
;
8n;m = 1; 2;    ; N; (IC)
(14f)
yn  0; 8n = 1; 2;    ; N: (14g)
5The feasibility conditions of the traffic offloading contacts
formulated in (14) will be analyzed and derived in Section V.
B. Contract design without information asymmetry
Without information asymmetry, the IC constraint is unnec-
essary because any SBS cannot be disguised as other types
of SBSs. Then the optimization problem of traffic offloading
processed by the SDWN controller can be formulated as (14),
with the IC constraint being removed. We provide the optimal
traffic offloading solution for the HetUDN as Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Without information asymmetry, the optimal traffic
offloading contract for type n (8n = 1; 2;    ; N ), which is
defined by (11), is given by
yuppern = n [ln ( n cn) ln (wn cn)]+
n n; (15a)
Tuppern (yn)=
cny
upper
n
 n
+ane
 
n n
n

e
y
upper
n
n  1

: (15b)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remarks: Notice that the value of social welfare in (10) is
equal to the MBS’s utility. In addition, all SBSs receive zero
net utility due to the selfish property of the MBS, who tries to
extract as much profit from SBSs’ offloading as possible when
satisfying the IR constraint shown as (14e). Solutions given in
Lemma 1 provide the first best contract solution for the traffic
offloading problem, since both the social welfare and MBS
utility are maximized and achieve the Pareto efficiency.
C. Contract design by linear pricing
Linear pricing based contracts are designed for the scenario
with information asymmetry. the SDWN controller designs a
optimal payment  to optimize the MBS utility without the IC
constraint, and then requests the MBS to pay  for every SBS
equally for one unit of offloaded traffic. In other words, the
SBS requesting more offloading traffic will get more payment
linearly. To maximize the SBS utility, every SBS tends to
request an appropriate amount of offloading traffic ylowern . We
provide the optimal traffic offloading contract selected by the
SBS and the optimal unit-price  in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. With information asymmetry, the optimal traffic
offloading contract for type n (8n = 1; 2;    ; N ) under the
linear pricing rule is given by
ylowern = n [ln (
 n cn) ln (wn cn)]+
n n; (16a)
T lowern = 
ylowern ; (16b)
where , designed by the SDWN controller to maximize the
MBS utility, is the solution of the following equation:
(   )

   cn
 n
 1
= ln

 n   cn
wn   cn

+

n n
n
: (17)
Proof: See Appendix B.
The contract-based traffic offloading designed above is
feasible and can be realized under the SDWN framework.
The required status information in Definition 1, 2 and 3 is
obtained through the ANDSF, and contracts satisfying IR and
IC are designed by the SDWN controller. However, enough
computing capacity of the SDWN controller and correspond-
ing modifications of the interface and interaction protocols are
still necessary to realize the contract-based traffic offloading.
V. CONDITIONS FOR CONTRACT FEASIBILITY
First, we propose the following Lemma 3 which provides
the condition that ensures the increasing concave property of
revenue function vn (yn) defined as (9).
Lemma 3. In a traffic offloading system with a set N of SBSs
indicated by n = 1; 2;    ; N . The arrival rate of SBS’s own
traffic requests is n = , 8n 2 N . Define
'n =
wn   cn
 n
e 

n n
 : (18)
With a bundle of traffic offloading contracts satisfying IR an
IC conditions, the traffic offloading allocated to SBS n is yn,
8n 2 N . Given yn  ym, (n;m 2 N ), if 'n  'm, then the
revenue function shown in (9) is a strictly increasing concave
function of the amount of traffic offloading allocated.
Proof: Take the first derivative of vn in (9) and we get
@vn(yn)
@yn
= wn cn n e
 
n n yn > 0: (19)
Therefore, revenue function vn (yn) is a strictly increasing
function of yn, 8n 2 N .
Given yn  ym, and according to IC conditions, the revenue
margin between SBS n and SBS m can be calculated by
vm (ym)  vn (yn)
=am
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i
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Take the first derivative of F1 (yn), and then we get
@F1(yn)
@yn
=

wn cn
 n
e 

n n
   wm cm
 m
e 

m m


e
yn
 :
When 'n  'm, then we have @F1 (yn)=@yn  0, which
reflects that with yn and ym increasing, the revenue margin
between yn and ym tends to be smaller. Consequently, the
revenue function shown in (9) is a strictly increasing concave
function of the amount of traffic offloading provided by SBSs.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
A feasible traffic offloading contract for the information-
asymmetry situation must ensure that without the knowledge
of SBS types, all SBSs can receive maximum net utility only
if they select the right contracts designed for their types. Based
on Lemma 3, the following Theorem 1 proposes the monotonic
property of SBS’s offload amount, payment, and net utility.
Theorem 1 demonstrates the feasibility of the proposed con-
tract based traffic offloading and resource allocation method
in Section IV-A for the HetUDN with different types of SBSs.
Theorem 1. Monotonicity: In an SDWN-based HetUDN with
N heterogeneous SBSs, the type of each SBS n (n 2N ) is
defined by Definition 1. Without the information of SBS types,
the SDWN controller designs a bundle of traffic offloading
contracts fT (y) ;yg for these N types of SBSs and the MBS,
according to the optimization problem formulated as (14).
6Consider that the arrival rates of traffic requests from SUEs
are equal for every SBS, i.e., n = , 8n. Then for each con-
tract fTn (yn) ; yng, the amount of traffic offload y allocated
to each SBS and payment T (y) obtained by (14) have the
monotonicity. Specifically, if and only if 1 < 2 <    < N ,
y1 < y2 <    < yN ; (20a)
T1 (y1) < T2 (y2) <    < TN (yN ) ; (20b)
V 01 < V
0
2 <    < V 0N : (20c)
Proof: We first prove that y1 < y2 <    < yN if and only
if 1 < 2 <    < N . According to the IC constraints in
(14f), we have 8n;m = 1; 2;    ; N ,
an

1  e 
n n yn

+ Tn (yn)  cnyn= n
 an

1  e 
n n ym

+ Tm (ym)  cnym= n;
(21a)
am

1  e 
m m ym

+ Tm (ym)  cmym= m
 am

1  e 
m m yn

+ Tn (yn)  cmyn= m:
(21b)
Necessity: Consider that 0yn  ym (8n;m2N , n 6=m).
For the concave property of the revenue function, the condition
of 'n'm is satisfied according to Lemma 3, and 'n='m
if and only if yn = ym. Then add the two inequalities above
in (21) together and then we get the following inequality
0 

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 
m m
   ane 
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

e
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   e yn

= ('m 'n)

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(ym yn) :
(22)
For 0ynym, the following inequality is always satisfied:
e
ym
   e yn  (ym   yn) =  0: (23)
According to (23), (22) can be transformed to
1

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
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which can be further derived as
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(25)
which is equal to
 n
cn+(wn cn) e 
n n
  m
cm+(wm cm) e 
m m
: (26)
According to the definition of , we can get n  m, and
n = m if and only if yn = ym.
Sufficiency: Consider Definition 1, 0<nm is equal to
cn
 n
+
wn   cn
 n
e 

n n
  cm
 m
+
wm   cm
 m
e 

m m
 ; (27)
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Hypothesise yn > ym > 0, then 'n > 'm, and inequality

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e
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   e ym

> yn   ym > 0 (29)
is always satisfied. Then (28) can be further derived as
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However, according to IC constraints and adding (21a) and
(21b) together, then we have
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Considering yn > ym > 0, (32) can be transformed as
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As an =  (wn   cn)= n, we can get
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(33)
which is a contradiction with (30). Therefore, the hypothesis
yn > ym is invalid, which means that yn  ym if n  m.
Then we have demonstrated the proposition that yn < ym
if and only if n < m, and yn = ym if and only if n = m.
Next, we will prove that T1 (y1) < T2 (y2) <    < TN (yN )
if and only if y1 < y2 <    < yN .
Sufficiency: 8n;m = 1; 2;  ; N; n 6= m, we have (21b)
according to IC constraints, which can be transformed to
Tn (yn) Tm (ym)ame 
m m

e
yn
  eym

+ cm
 m
(yn ym) ;
and then we get Tn (yn)  Tm (ym) if yn  ym.
Necessity: Inequality (21a) obtained by the IC constraints
can be transformed to
ane
 
n n
 
e
yn
  eym + cn n (yn ym)Tn(yn) Tm(ym) :
Given Tn (yn)  Tm (ym), the left part of the inequality above
can be written by
ane
 
n n


e
yn
   e ym

+ cn
 n
(yn   ym)  0; (34)
which can be satisfied only by 0  yn  ym.
Then we have demonstrated the proposition that Tn (yn) <
Tm (ym) if and only if yn < ym, and Tn (yn) = Tm (ym)
if and only if yn = ym. Due to the transferability of the
necessary and sufficient conditions, Tn (yn) < Tm (ym) if and
only if n<m, and Tn (yn)=Tm (ym) if and only if n=m.
Last, we will prove the monotonicity of SBS’s net utility.
According to (7), (8) and the IC constraints in Definition 3,
the net utility difference between SBS n and SBS m (8n;m =
1; 2;    ; N , n 6= m) can be calculated as
V 0m   V 0n = Vm   Pm (
m)  (Vn   Pn (
n))
=am
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(36)
Consider that n<m, then yn<ym and 'n < 'm according
to (20a) in Theorem 1 proved previously and Lemma 3,
respectively. Let yn=0 in F2 (yn), and according to the results
of Pm (
m) and Pm (
m) calculated by (5), we have
F2 (0) =am

1  e 
m m

  an

1  e 
n n

  Pm (
m) + Pn (
n) = 0:
(37)
According to the expression of n defined in Definition 1 and
considering that yn > 0, the first derivative of F2 (yn) with
respect to yn can be written as
@F2 (yn)
@yn
=

cn
 n
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 m

+ ('n   'm) e
yn



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 m

+ ('n   'm)
=

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
 

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 m
+ 'm

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1
n
  1
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> 0:
(38)
The necessity of (20c) can be proved by applying the
reduction to absurdity. Since the proving idea is similar to (35)
- (38), we omit the proof of necessity for (20c). Therefore, we
have V 0n<V 0m, if and only if n<m, and V 0n= V 0m, if
and only if n= m, 8n;m2N , n 6= m. This completes the
proof of Theorem 1.
Remarks:
1) Valid of SBS type definition: Theorem 1 demonstrates
that SBS type n proposed and defined in Definition 1 is
reasonable, since it can effectively reflect the influence of het-
erogeneous SBSs’ performance and capacity on the contract
designed by a competitive market based economics theory.
2) Fairness and monotonicity: Theorem 1 demonstrate
that, for both of the service requester and service providers,
i.e., the MBS and SBSs, respectively, the proposed contract-
based traffic offloading and resource allocation mechanism
as (14) guarantees the fairness and incentive property of the
transmission resource market, in the scenario of information
asymmetry and that service providers are heterogeneous. On
the one hand, monotonicity of (20a) and (20b) implies that for
the SBSs with higher , they are more suitable for offloading
traffic, and their best choice to achieve highest payoff is
offloading larger amount of traffic. Meanwhile, they will
receive more payment. This contract principle can ensure the
fairness among the heterogeneous SBSs. On the other hand,
monotonicity also provides an incentive for SBSs. Specifically,
if a high type of SBS selects the contract designed for low
types of SBSs, even though a small amount of traffic offloading
will be requested by the SDWN controller, the corresponding
low payment will deteriorate this high-type SBS’s payment.
3) Incentive Compatibility: Monotonicity of (20c) also im-
plies that the incentive for SBSs is compatible, which means
that SBSs with high capability will receive more net utility
than low ones. For those SBSs whose types cannot be aware of
the MBS and SDWN controller, the designed contract is self-
revealing for SBSs, since that each type of SBS will receive
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Fig. 2. Distributions of MUEs, MBS and SBSs in the simulation scene. (The
red dotted circle is the coverage of the MBS.)
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
System parameters Value settting
Transmission power of MBS 46 dBm
Transmission power of SBSs  U [15; 35] dBm
Path loss of MBS 28:3 + 22:0log10l, l (km)
Path loss of SBSs 30:5 + 36:7log10l, l (km)
MBS / SBS bandwidth 20 MHz
MBS / SBS operating frequency 2:6 GHz / 2:4 GHz
SBSs’ own traffic requests arrival rate  = 10 Mbps
Power spectral density of thermal noise  174 dBm/Hz
the maximum net utility, which reflects the net revenue by
offloading, if and only if it selects the right traffic offloading
contract designed exactly for its type.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this part, we will use MATLAB 2016b to evaluate
the proposed contract-based traffic offloading and resource
allocation. First of all, we introduce the scenario setup of the
simulations. In the following simulations, we assume a typical
4G/5G macrocell with a transmission radius of 500 m. The
HetUDN consists of one MBS, N=100 heterogeneous SBSs
with N=100 different types, and M=250 MUEs. Both SBSs
and MUEs are randomly distributed within the macrocell. The
distribution of network elements in the simulation is shown as
Fig. 2. In addition, we set cn =0:6, wn =1 and  = 1. The
other main parameters of the HetUDN are shown in Table I.
To demonstrate monotonicity and incentive compatibility
of the contract, the indexes of SBSs are sorted according to
their values of type obtained by Definition 1. By applying the
three different contracts designed in Section IV, we obtain the
amount of traffic offloading requested by SBSs and payments
required to the MBS, which are shown as Fig. 3(a) and
Fig. 3(b), respectively. In Fig. 3, results illustrate that both
the amount of traffic offloading and payment increase with the
value of SBS type increasing, for the three different contracts,
which reflects the fairness of the contracts. In addition, among
the three contracts, the no information asymmetry contract
requires the highest amount of traffic offloading and the
highest payment for SBSs, followed by the incentive contract
proposed in Section IV-A. The lowest traffic offloading and
payment are requested by the linear pricing contract.
Moreover, the incentive compatibility of the contract de-
signed in Section IV-A is verified by results shown in Fig. 3(c).
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Fig. 3. The contract monotonicity and incentive compatibility versus different SBS types.
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Fig. 4. System performance of different types of SBSs when applying different traffic offloading and resource allocation mechanisms.
Fig. 3(c) presents the net utility received by selecting N = 100
different contracts in the contract bundle for four sample SBSs
n = 1; 10; 50; 90. The pentagram marks in Fig. 3(c) are
the maximum net utility received for the four SBSs, and the
corresponding horizontal axes points are the indexes of SBS
types that contracts are designed for. Results indicate that for
each type of SBS, the maximum net utility can be achieved
only by selecting the right contract designed for this type.
By applying three different contracts, the system perfor-
mance of HetUDN is shown as Fig. 4, which presents that
the MBS utility, SBS net utility and social welfare increase
monotonically with the value of SBS type growing. Results in
Fig. 4(a) show that the contract for the scenario without infor-
mation asymmetry brings the maximum utility for the MBS.
Under the case that the SBS types are unavailable, the designed
IC-based contract can only bring a approximate optimal utility
for the MBS, which is upper bounded by the no information
asymmetry situation. With information asymmetry, the linear
pricing based contract does not treat differently to all types
of SBSs. Therefore, without the knowledge of SBS type, the
linear pricing performs worst on the MBS utility.
Since the MBS is selfish, when it is aware of the type of
every BSS, the designed contract only need to satisfy the IR
constraints when maximizing the MBS utility. Then every SBS
can only get the utility equal to that of providing no offloading
service, which means that the net utility is zero for every
SBS, as shown in Fig. 4(b). By applying the contract with
IC constraints, only the SBS with the lowest type value will
receive zero-net utility, and SBSs with lower  will receive
less net utility than that obtained by linear pricing contract.
However, for those SBSs with higher , they can receive
more net utility than that obtained by linear pricing contract,
which demonstrates the incentive compatibility of the IC based
contract. The social welfare shown in Fig. 4(c) presents a
similar result as Fig. 4(a). In addition, with the IC based
contract for information asymmetry, the SBS with the highest
 brings the same social welfare as no information asymmetry.
Next, we study that how the contract and system perfor-
mance change with the changing density of SBSs. Let the
number of SBSs in the macrocell system varies from 20 to
100, and other parameters are set as before. The average traffic
offloaded and the average payments for each SBS versus the
nember of SBSs (types) are shown in Fig 5. The differences
between the effects on the amount of traffic offloading by three
traffic offloading contracts shown in Fig. 5(a) are similar to
that of Fig. 3(a). In addition, the average amount of traffic
offloading for every SBS decreases when the number of SBSs
grows, which results that if the amount of total traffic request
are fixed, distributing more SBSs will lighten the load of
every BS. Fig. 5(b) indicates that the average payment for
each SBS does not change by applying the contract for the no
information asymmetry case and the linear pricing contract, no
matter how many SBSs in the HetUDN. By applying the IC
based contract for the information asymmetry case, the average
payment obtained by per SBS decreases when the number
of SBS increases. These results reflect the high effectiveness
and efficiency of the contract designed in Section IV-A.
Specifically, when there are more SBSs in the system, which
means that more candidates can provide the traffic offloading
service and the competitiveness among these SBSs tends to
be weak, the average payment provided by the MBS for each
SBS will be less than that in a more competitive market.
Due the same reason explained above, the average MBS
utility, average SBS net utility and average social welfare by
one SBS will all decrease with increasing number of SBS, by
applying the three contracts, except that the SBS net utility
obtained under the no information asymmetry case is always
zero, as shown in Fig. 6. In addition, the social welfare shown
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Fig. 5. The contract performance versus the number of different SBS types.
in Fig. 6(c) also implies the approximate optimization property
of the IC based contract for the information asymmetry case.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a contract-based traffic
offloading and resource allocation mechanism for the SDWN-
cased HetUDN. In the scenario with information asymmetry,
the designed IC based traffic offloading contract has the incen-
tive property to encourage every SBS to select the right con-
tract designed personally to it, which specifies the amount of
traffic offloading and the payment from the MBS. In addition,
the SBS utility, MBS utility and social welfare can achieve
an approximate optimization, comparing the situation without
information asymmetry, and better than that achieved by linear
pricing contract with information asymmetry. Furthermore, the
definition of SBS type proposed in this work provides a valid
index to measure the offloading performance of heterogeneous
SBSs. Meanwhile, the SBS type definition also guarantee
the monotonicity and incentive compatibility of contracts. In
addition, the defined closed-form expression of SBS type
makes this definition enforceable to be applied in HetNets
with densely distributed BSs for resource management.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: The objective function (14a) can be rewritten as
UM =
P
n2N n
h

P
i2Mn;s0i=1 ri + yn   Tn (yn)
i
: (39)
Consider that the SBSs are selfish and with the IR constraint
same as (14e), we have
Tn (yn) = n'n

e
yn
n   1

+ cnyn= n: (40)
Replace Tn (yn) in (39) with (40), and take the first derivative:
@UM=@yn = n

   'ne
yn
n   cnyn= n

: (41)
Then we get the optimal amount of traffic offloaded by SBS
n under the non-information asymmetry situation as
yuppern = n [ln (   cn= n)  ln'n] : (42)
The same result can also be obtained through the Lagrange
function approach. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: Let  denote the payment of one unit of offloaded
traffic for every SBS n = 1; 2; : : : ; N . Under the linear pricing
contract situation, the utility of SBS is
Vn = an

1  e 
n n ynn

+ yn   cnyn= n: (43)
Take the first derivative of Vn and we get
@Vn=@yn =  'ne
yn
n +    cn= n: (44)
To maximize the SBS utility under the linear pricing contract,
the optimal offloading requested by SBS n can be obtained as
ylowern = n [ln (   cn= n)  ln'n] : (45)
Replace yn in (39) with (45), and the MBS utility is given by
U ()=
X
n2N n
h

X
i2Mn;s0i=1
ri+( ) yn
i
: (46)
Take the first derivative with respect to , and then we can
get the optimal  as the solution of the following equation:
(   ) (   cn= n) 1 = ln (   cn= n)  ln ('n) : (47)
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
REFERENCES
[1] X. Costa-Perez, A. Garcia-Saavedra, X. Li, T. Deiss, A. de la Oliva,
A. di Giglio, P. Iovanna, and A. Moored, “5G-crosshaul: An SD-
N/NFV integrated fronthaul/backhaul transport network architecture,”
IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 38–45, Feb. 2017.
[2] S. Chen, F. Qin, B. Hu, X. Li, and J. Liu, “Ultra-dense network
architecture and technologies for 5G,” in 5G Mobile Communications.
Springer, 2017, pp. 403–429.
[3] C. Jiang, B. Wang, Y. Han, Z.-H. Wu, and K. R. Liu, “Spatial focusing
inspired 5g spectrum sharing,” in IEEE Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech
and Signal Process. (ICASSP). New Orleans, LA, USA, 5–9 Mar. 2017,
pp. 3609–3613.
[4] J. G. Andrews, S. Buzzi, W. Choi, S. V. Hanly, A. Lozano, A. C. Soong,
and J. C. Zhang, “What will 5g be?” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.,
vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 1065–1082, Jun. 2014.
[5] J. Ding, R. Yu, Y. Zhang, S. Gjessing, and D. H. Tsang, “Service
provider competition and cooperation in cloud-based software defined
wireless networks,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 11, pp. 134–140,
Nov. 2015.
[6] S. Kang and W. Yoon, “SDN-based resource allocation for heteroge-
neous LTE and wlan multi-radio networks,” J. Supercomputing, vol. 72,
no. 4, pp. 1342–1362, Feb. 2016.
[7] Y. Zhang, L. Liu, Y. Gu, D. Niyato, M. Pan, and Z. Han, “Offloading
in software defined network at edge with information asymmetry: A
contract theoretical approach,” J. Signal Process. Syst., vol. 83, no. 2,
pp. 241–253, May 2016.
10
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Number of SBSs
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Av
er
ag
e 
ut
ilit
y 
of
 M
BS
 fr
om
 o
ne
 S
BS
No information asymmetry
Linear
Information asymmetry
40 45 50
18
20
22
24
(a) Average MBS utility from one SBS
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Number of SBSs
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Av
er
ag
e 
ne
t u
tili
ty
 o
f S
BS
No information asymmetry
Linear
Information asymmetry
(b) Average net utility of SBSs
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Number of SBSs
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Av
er
ag
e 
so
cia
l w
el
fa
re
 fr
om
 o
ne
 S
BS
No information asymmetry
Linear
Information asymmetry
40 45 50
20
25
70 75 80
10
12
14
16
(c) Average social welfare from one SBS
Fig. 6. System performance versus the number of SBSs when applying different traffic offloading and resource allocation mechanisms.
[8] E. Baccarelli, N. Cordeschi, A. Mei, M. Panella, M. Shojafar, and
J. Stefa, “Energy-efficient dynamic traffic offloading and reconfiguration
of networked data centers for big data stream mobile computing: review,
challenges, and a case study,” IEEE Network, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 54–61,
Mar. 2016.
[9] Y. Mao, J. Zhang, and K. B. Letaief, “Dynamic computation offloading
for mobile-edge computing with energy harvesting devices,” IEEE J.
Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 12, pp. 3590–3605, Dec. 2016.
[10] S. Zhang, N. Zhang, S. Zhou, J. Gong, Z. Niu, and X. Shen, “Energy-
aware traffic offloading for green heterogeneous networks,” IEEE J. Sel.
Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 1116–1129, May 2016.
[11] Y. Wu, K. Guo, J. Huang, and X. S. Shen, “Secrecy-based energy-
efficient data offloading via dual connectivity over unlicensed spectrum-
s,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 12, pp. 3252–3270, Dec.
2016.
[12] F. Mehmeti and T. Spyropoulos, “Performance analysis of mobile data
offloading in heterogeneous networks,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Computing,
vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 482–496, Feb. 2017.
[13] N. C. Nguyen, P. Wang, D. Niyato, Y. Wen, and Z. Han, “Resource
management in cloud networking using economic analysis and pricing
models: A survey,” IEEE Commun. Surveys & Tutorials, vol. PP, no. 99,
pp. 1–49, Jan. 2017.
[14] L. Gao, G. Iosifidis, J. Huang, L. Tassiulas, and D. Li, “Bargaining-
based mobile data offloading,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 32,
no. 6, pp. 1114–1125, Jun. 2014.
[15] M. I. Kamel and K. M. Elsayed, “ABSF offsetting and optimal resource
partitioning for eICIC in LTE-Advanced: Proposal and analysis using a
nash bargaining approach,” in IEEE Int. Conf. on Commun. (ICC 2013).
Budapest, Hungary, 9-13 Jun. 2013.
[16] B. C. Chung and D.-H. Cho, “Mobile data offloading with almost blank
subframe in LTE-LAA and Wi-Fi coexisting networks based on coalition
game,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 608–611, Nov. 2016.
[17] T. M. Ho, N. H. Tran, L. B. Le, W. Saad, S. A. Kazmi, and C. S.
Hong, “Coordinated resource partitioning and data offloading in wireless
heterogeneous networks,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 974–
977, May 2016.
[18] A. F. Hanif, H. Tembine, M. Assaad, and D. Zeghlache, “Mean-field
games for resource sharing in cloud-based networks,” IEEE/ACM Trans.
Networking, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 624–637, Feb. 2016.
[19] S. Samarakoon, M. Bennis, W. Saad, M. Debbah, and M. Latva-Aho,
“Ultra dense small cell networks: Turning density into energy efficiency,”
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 1267–1280, May 2016.
[20] X. Xu, C. Yuan, J. Li, and X. Tao, “Energy-efficient active offloading
with collaboration communication and power allocations for hetero-
geneous ultradense networks,” Trans. Emerging Telecommun. Technol.,
vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–9, Feb. 2017.
[21] E. Gelenbe, “Analysis of automated auctions,” in Computer and Inform.
Sci.–ISCIS. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[22] ——, “Analysis of single and networked auctions,” ACM Trans. Internet
Technol., vol. 9, no. 2, p. 8, 2009.
[23] E. Gelenbe and L. Gyo¨rfi, “Performance of auctions and sealed bids,”
in Computer Performance Eng. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, pp.
30–43.
[24] E. Gelenbe and K. Velan, “An approximate model for bidders in
sequential automated auctions,” in Agent and Multi-Agent Systems:
Technol. and Applicat. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 70–79.
[25] ——, “Modelling bidders in sequential automated auctions,” Proc. of 8th
Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Syst. (AAMAS 2009),
Budapest, Hungary, 2009.
[26] K. Velan and E. Gelenbe, “Analysing bidder performance in randomised
and fixed-deadline automated auctions,” in Agent and Multi-Agent Syst.:
Technol. and Applications. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 42–
51.
[27] A. Di Ferdinando, R. Lent, and E. Gelenbe, “A framework for autonomic
networked auctions,” in Proc. of the 2007 Workshop on Innovative
Service Technol. ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-
Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering), 2007, p. 3.
[28] G. Sakellari, T. Leung, and E. Gelenbe, “Auction-based admission
control for self-aware networks,” in Computer and Inform. Sci. II.
Springer London, 2012, pp. 223–230.
[29] G. Iosifidis, L. Gao, J. Huang, and L. Tassiulas, “A double-auction
mechanism for mobile data-offloading markets,” IEEE/ACM Trans.
Networking, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 1634–1647, Oct. 2015.
[30] D. Zhang, Z. Chang, and T. Hamalainen, “Reverse combinatorial auction
based resource allocation in heterogeneous software defined network
with infrastructure sharing,” in IEEE 83rd Veh. Technol. Conf. (VTC
Spring 2016),. Nanjing, China, 15-18 May 2016.
[31] Y. Zhang, L. Song, W. Saad, Z. Dawy, and Z. Han, “Contract-based
incentive mechanisms for device-to-device communications in cellular
networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33, no. 10, pp. 2144–2155,
Oct. 2015.
[32] A. Asheralieva and Y. Miyanaga, “Optimal contract design for joint user
association and inter-cell interference mitigation in heterogeneous lte-a
networks with asymmetric information,” IEEE Trans. on Veh. Technol.,
vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–15, Oct. 2016.
[33] M. Peng, X. Xie, Q. Hu, J. Zhang, and H. V. Poor, “Contract-based
interference coordination in heterogeneous cloud radio access networks,”
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 1140–1153, Jun. 2015.
Jun Du (S’16) received her B.S. degree in information and communication
engineering from the Beijing Institute of Technology, China, in 2009, and the
M.S. degree in information and communication engineering from Tsinghua
University, Beijing, in 2014, where she is currently pursuing the Ph.D.
Erol Gelenbe (S’67-M’70-SM’79-F’86-LF’11) is the Professor in the Dennis
Gabor Chair at the Electrical and Electronic Engineering Department, Imperial
College, London. He currently works on energy savings, security and Quality
of Service in networks and the Cloud.
Chunxiao Jiang (S’09-M’13-SM’15) received the B.S. in information engi-
neering from Beihang University in Jun. 2008 and the Ph.D. in electronic
engineering from Tsinghua University in Jan. 2013, both with the highest
honors. From Feb. 2013 to Jun. 2016, Dr. Jiang was a Postdoc in the
Department of Electronic Engineering Tsinghua University, during which he
visited University of Maryland College Park and University of Southampton.
Haijun Zhang (M’13-SM’16) received the Ph.D. degree from Beijing U-
niversity of Posts Telecommunications (BUPT), Beijing, China. He was a
Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Yong Ren (SM’16) received his B.S, M.S and Ph.D. degrees in electronic
engineering from Harbin Institute of Technology, China, in 1984, 1987, and
1994, respectively. He worked as a post doctor at Department of Electronics
Engineering, Tsinghua University, China from 1995 to1997. Now he is a
professor of Department of Electronics Engineering in Tsinghua University.
